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SHAKSPER 2008: SHAKSPER Roundtable: Shakespeare's Intentions
From: Hardy M. Cook (editor@SHAKSPER.NET) Date: 07/24/08
The Shakespeare Conference: SHK 19.0433 Thursday, 24 July 2008 From: David Schalkwyk <David.Schalkwyk@uct.ac.za> Date: Wednesday, 23 Jul 2008 05:25:56 +0200 Subject: SHAKSPER Roundtable: Shakespeare's Intentions (Addendum) I've just rejoined the land of electronic communication to see that I've being able to contribute to Cary's last Roundtable Digest. I'm pleased to see, however, his invitation to continue the discussion as part of the normal conversation. I'd like to thank Cary for being a superb co-ordinator, as well as my fellow contributors for their tough but open-minded engagement. My desire to say one more thing stems from Larry Weiss's lament (on 10 July) that the "distinction between what an author intended by his words (critical analysis) and what words the author intended to use (textual analysis)" has not been "addressed explicitly." I think that Larry is right that this distinction is closely related to Duncan Salkeld's insistence that at "a naively holistic level, intentionality is entirely vapid. But when examining particular textual details and their relationships, intention becomes not only a question worth raising but sometimes essential." Clarifying this distinction will also, I hope, cast light on my own "flip-flop" between declaring intention inescapable and ultimately entirely heuristic or even redundant. I responded to the distinction that Larry makes in an earlier post, where I pointed out that the kind of intention that informs the words an author meant to use is invoked by some philosophers as "categorical" intention. Such intention also encompasses what Hugh Grady calls "aesthetic" meaning: that is to say, the intention to write a play of a particular genre with a specific, but broadly conceived, aesthetic effect and affect. Leaving aside for the moment whether such "aesthetic meaning" is or is not necessarily conceptual, I think a good case can be made for the position that to speak of these things (this or that word? a play or an epic? a tragedy or a comedy?) must involve an appeal to intention, or is considerably helped by an appeal to what the author wanted to do (of course, the author may, for a number of reasons, not have succeeded). However, I think an equally good case can be made for the position that when it comes to deciding on the meaning of these words, or that passage, or those images, an appeal to an author's intention is not only unnecessary, but can in fact be positively unhelpful (see my argument relating the heuristic nature of intention, its redundancy, and the fact that the appeal to intention is in these cases a rhetorical ploy in an essentially political debate). Now the intriguing question is: what is the difference? Why intention in one case but not in the other? The answer, I propose, lies not in the nature of intention, but rather in that of language. It's the introduction of meaning that severely attenuates (even if it does not negate) the controlling reach of intention. I can intend to use "solid" rather than "sullied", and it makes sense to ask which word I meant to use (even if there is too little evidence to decide the matter). But when an interpreter asks about the meaning of "solid" rather than "sullied", he or she is invoking not a binary choice between two signifiers, but rather a complex set of relations to other signifiers and contexts (local and historical) through which a signified (or signifieds) are produced that lie beyond the controlling or determining ambit of any intention. The choice of signifiers is intentionally driven, but the production of signifieds ultimately escapes intention. (The latter is Derrida's argument that intention cannot control the filed of meaning.) Humpty Dumpty is wrong to say that words mean what he wants them to mean; he would be right, however, to say that only he can chose to use these rather than those words. The interesting thing about this argument is that it shows that whether we can know a particular intention or not is irrelevant in both cases. There may not be sufficient evidence to determine whether Shakespeare intended to use "solid" rather than "sullied", but that does not mean that it is illegitimate to approach the question via the concept of intention. On the other hand, an author may tell us what s/he intended a text to mean, but there is no reason to believe him or her if our reading the text contradicts this (_Mansfield Park_ is about ordination?) Here we trust the tale, not the teller. This means that the question of knowledge of an author's intentions is irrelevant to the issue about whether we should be talking about intentions at all. It's a conceptual, not an epistemological issue. Another noteworthy point is that in practice questions of a textual sort are determined by decisions of an interpretive bent. So, in the absence of any firm evidence about whether Shakespeare meant to use "solid" rather than "sullied" (or "sallied"--or "rest" rather than "rust" in _R&J_) editors and critics will decide on the basis of which signifier fits best with their overall reading of the meaning of the speech, character or situation. It may be for this reason that Duncan wishes to retain an appeal to intention as a necessity: to determine the factual details of a text independently of a favorite interpretation of that text, or to prevent a settled signified derived independently of what the author wanted as a signifier from determining the signifier that he could well have wanted. This is very rough, and belated. But I hope it will be of interest to some, and I trust that I will be corrected where I have gone egregiously wrong. David _______________________________________________________________ S H A K S P E R: The Global Shakespeare Discussion List Hardy M. Cook, editor@shaksper.net The S H A K S P E R Web Site <http://www.shaksper.net> DISCLAIMER: Although SHAKSPER is a moderated discussion list, the opinions expressed on it are the sole property of the poster, and the editor assumes no responsibility for them.
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