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SHAKSPER 2007: SHAKSPER Roundtable: Presentism
From: Hardy M. Cook (editor@shaksper.net) Date: 03/19/07
The Shakespeare Conference: SHK 18.0199 Monday, 19 March 2007 From: Hugh Grady <hughgrady@comcast.net> Date: Monday, 19 Mar 2007 09:44:15 -0400 Subject: SHAKSPER Roundtable: Presentism This week's contributions to the Roundtable on Presentism include two follow-ups to last week's postings-a reply to some of my comments by Tony Burton and a reply to remarks by Ewan Fernie on his own earlier post by David Lindley. I will conclude with a few brief comments below. I'm thinking that this Roundtable is reaching its endgame, and I invite readers who have been procrastinating in sending in their comments to do so within the next couple of weeks. --Hugh Grady [1] +++++++++++++++ Tony Burton <aburton1@comcast.net> Oh dear, let me try to disentangle from Hugh Grady's legitimate criticism from that which seems to be simply a debatable point of view, and then also from misunderstandings of what I may have phrased badly, and so rescue my wounded name a trifle. First, I don't conflate presentism with subjectivism. I merely said they confront similar dilemmas, and my use of "or" is to be read as disjunctive rather than conjunctive. Unlike Shakespeare, my ambiguous constructions sadly end up as barriers to clear understanding, rather than stimuli to greater insight. Second, I would say that becoming truly conscious (in Hugh's sense) of one's own "biases, deficiencies, and limitations" is so close to the effort at overcoming them (in my sense, which is not exactly Hugh's 'clear them away') that a practitioner with Hugh's sense of discipline would make an admirable presentist, free from its most irksome abuses. Regarding careerism, I don't by any means impugn individual scholars for willfully selling out. Hugh is right, to be sure, that one doesn't become a Shakespeare scholar for reasons of careerism, in the ordinary sense of the word. But I am surely not alone in noticing that journals, including the most prestigious in literature and Shakespeare studies, are known to have strong biases in favor of exploring-perhaps for a decade-one or more points of view only, and refusing to consider others until the wheel turns and they once again become fashionable. So, papers are written according to the publishable fashion, as it may be from time to time. In a world where publishing is so important to career development, it seems not unfair to me to characterize the consequence as careerism. However, many-often the best-university departments are dominated by a single strong personality who has often built a reputation on a narrow if worthy style of inquiry. Graduate students and junior faculty are predictably encouraged to advance the agenda of the "star" and ignore other (and certainly, contrary) avenues of inquiry. None of this is new or revolutionary and none of it is meant to suggest that the work done is unscholarly. In fact Hugh seems to agree with me here, pointing to his own credentials for having pointed out and opposed what he calls "repressive disciplinary processes." This seems to be exactly what I refer to and, if it weren't for my unfortunate gift of being misconstrued, I would say the topic brings us together as strange bedfellows But the same "repressive" process does result in a narrowing of focus within academe, and sadly consistent with presentist viewpoints, when the author lacks Hugh's consciousness of his or her own biases. It often also results in disputations over ideological positioning as to this or that subject, long before the nature and content of the subject is adequately understood. Since Shakespeare's works in general, i.e. "the things themselves" of my earlier post, still remain highly debatable as to their nature and content, I simply want to lobby for greater attention to them than to the features of our own contemporary "manner," with which presentism is most concerned. My sense of the matter is that attention to the "things" is happily now more in evidence than it has been for many long years, and ideology less prominent. If my reference to "diatribes" is not justified by the evidence of postings on this list alone, without going elsewhere -- if they are merely the "give and take of professional debate" which Hugh Grady defends-then I apologize without seeking a referendum. My private, and clearly unprofessional and maybe hypersensitive opinion, is that too many of them are intemperate and that they personalize disagreement to a degree that suggests intolerance and ideological inflexibility; it must then remain a private opinion only, and I regret having used the offending word in what I meant to be a serious and constructive observation. In other respects, Hugh makes a series of valid points. Anyone who reads both posts will see that I don't agree with all of them. But I respect them and gladly let them stand on their own merits alongside my own thoughts, as here clarified. Tony [2] +++++++++++++++ David Lindley <D.Lindley@leeds.ac.uk> I originally wrote that: 'there seems a great reluctance to interrogate whose 'present' is being invoked' in 'presentism'. To which Ewan Fernie replied: 'I think Lindley makes a moot point: the present is a slippery thing, . . .' and then asserted:'We KNOW the elusive complexity of the present, but the prestige of history and the poverty of the historical record (which can never approximate the confounding richness of 'life') often combine to endow history with a fallacious objectivity. Unease about a generalised present might profitably lead to unease about a generalised past.' To which the answer is, of course, that in any responsible history that is undoubtedly true; I repeatedly question the generalisations of my students precisely by asking them to consider how various opinion now is, and how it might also have been in the past. But Fernie is slightly missing my point. What I was remarking, having read the prescribed texts, is the way a good deal of what is there offered precisely does not interrogate the notion of the present that it constructs, and is quite as uncritical of its generalisations as any history might be. What I would also believe is that in certain respects, sad individual that I am, I actually know (bits of) the past rather better than I do (bits of) the present - I can certainly gloss a Shakespearean text with a good deal more certainty than I can an adolescent text message; and it is absolutely true that the music of Byrd and Dowland speaks to me with much greater immediacy, richness and subtlety than 98% of the music that pours at me from multiple sources. Fernie goes on, interestingly, to comment on the primacy of aesthetic experience, suggesting that 'for most readers and audiences, it's the primary, the passionate and pleasurable thing, the reason for bothering with literary scholarship in the first place' and remarking the difficulty of articulating this in 'professional' criticism. I would nearly agree, on both counts - but I'm not sure that 'literary scholarship' can so simply be wholly identified with aesthetic pleasure - and it's in the area of difference between them that, perhaps, something of this debate is negotiated. I myself would say that the pleasure of scholarship (as distinct from aesthetic pleasure) starts with simple questions like 'what does this word mean'; 'what on earth is Shakespeare talking about here' - questions which lead one, or in my view lead one, inevitably to historical enquiry - to the OED and beyond. I am still convinced that unless one is prepared to ask and attempt to answer these historical questions, then one risks diminishing the study of literature (and, possibly, the aesthetic pleasure that one takes in the objects of the past). Fernie concludes: 'A more honest negotiation of the gap between the intensely privatised present of aesthetic experience and any critical, let alone political, conversation might benefit us all'. This is certainly true - but I think it's a rather different argument from that with which he began - and I would want to include in my 'intensely privatised' experience of the text, my attempt to understand its pastness, as well as its presentness in my experience of reading. I am just a little bothered by the moral nudging implied in the adjective 'honest', here. It has been the way of criticism to cast aspersions on those who went before - on benighted liberal humanists, on ahistorical new critics, on unpolitical old historicists, and now on dishonest historicism. I'm now old enough to have been through the discarding of orthodoxies several times, and for that reason, if none other, am ready to be sceptical of the latest credo - willing to learn, even to change - but not to become a subscriber. David Lindley +++++++++++++++ Commentary by Hugh Grady I am sorry to see that my call for greater attention to the issue of the necessary "presentness" of works of art and the relation of the political and the aesthetic has gone unanswered, except for a few remarks by David Lindley that, in distinguishing between aesthetic pleasure and scholarship, touch obliquely on the topic. I hope that next week might be different in this regard. I don't want to re-direct the forum's topic into the issue of the institutions and practices of academic criticism, so I will simply stand by my previous comments on this subject and thank Tony Burton for clarifying his earlier points, apologizing for unintended meanings, and further elaborating them for us. As I stated in the introduction to this week's Roundtable, the time is now for those who may have been putting off contributing to the discussion. Since repeated back-and-forth debates between specific contributors become tedious, I especially want to invite new voices into the forum in what will be its last few appearances. _______________________________________________________________ S H A K S P E R: The Global Shakespeare Discussion List Hardy M. Cook, editor@shaksper.net The S H A K S P E R Web Site <http://www.shaksper.net> DISCLAIMER: Although SHAKSPER is a moderated discussion list, the opinions expressed on it are the sole property of the poster, and the editor assumes no responsibility for them.
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