SHAKSPER 2000: Re: Isabella's Chastity

From: Hardy M. Cook (editor@ws.bowiestate.edu)
Date: 06/16/00 

The Shakespeare Conference: SHK 11.1226  Friday, 15 June 2000.

[1]     From:   Sean Lawrence <seanlawrence@writeme.com>
        Date:   Wednesday, 14 Jun 2000 11:27:53 -0700
        Subj:   Re: SHK 11.1213 Re: Isabella's Chastity

[2]     From:   Don Bloom <dbloo@asms.net>
        Date:   Wednesday, 14 Jun 2000 12:16:30 -0700
        Subj:   Re: SHK 11.1222 Re: Isabella's Chastity

[3]     From:   Philip Tomposki <PhilipTski@aol.com>
        Date:   Wednesday, 14 Jun 2000 16:11:36 EDT
        Subj:   Re: Isabella's Chastity


[1]-----------------------------------------------------------------
From:           Sean Lawrence <seanlawrence@writeme.com>
Date:           Wednesday, 14 Jun 2000 11:27:53 -0700
Subject: 11.1213 Re: Isabella's Chastity
Comment:        Re: SHK 11.1213 Re: Isabella's Chastity

Ed Taft has rather kind things to say about my and Ian Munro's comments
on this list, and I feel that I ought to respond.

Ian suggests that we might frame Angelo's malfeasance "as political
instead of moral (not that the two are completely separable)".  I'd
agree that it's certainly possible to do this, but I'd further argue
that a framing of issues politically rather than morally, or turning
moral issues into political issues, seems to be the direction of the
play.  From Angelo's decision to execute Claudio, to his own desire in
the last few lines to be punished by death, almost all of the characters
show a tendency to turn moral or ethical issues into political issues,
resting within the demesne of the state.  Rather than limiting itself to
such thoughts as treason, the Viennese state of the play and the
Elizabethan state which informs it, were both extending the competence
of the state widely, and far beyond what would be necessary to maintain
the earthly city.  The Duke claims (appallingly, in my humble opinion)
that he has confessed Isabella, for instance, and Marlowe was prosecuted
(at least in part) for atheism.

Sins (of the will, to borrow Ed's distinction) are prosecuted as crimes,
and conversely, crimes are forgiven like sins.  Or rather, almost, but
not quite, like sins.  Most of the various acts of forgiveness in the
final scene work themselves out in a series of exchanges, restoring
social order, and ultimately leaving the Duke in control.  Rather than
forgiveness being really generous, and serving as a rupture in the
political 'game', it merely becomes another element in a set of
self-interested exchanges in the fallen world.  The political shows a
lamentable tendency towards totalization, not only in the tendency of
critics to find political motivations for the characters's acts (which,
after all, there are), but also in the tendency of the political game to
co-opt and reduce what stands over and against it.  Rather than serving
as a rupture to the network of quid-pro-quo exchanges which make up
fallen existence, forgiveness just becomes another element in such
exchanges.

But does the political entirely succeed in reducing the ethical to
itself?  Is there the possibility of viewing the political from without,
and therefore judging it?  I think that at two points, politics fails.

First, as David Lindley has convincingly shown in a 1996 article in
Shakespeare Yearbook, the Duke's unwillingness to execute Barnardine
shows more than Barnardine's resistance:  it shows that conscientious
considerations can be overriding. (I'm sure, David, that you'll be kind
enough to correct me if I'm recalling the article incorrectly).

Secondly, Isabella forgives Angelo without getting anything in
exchange.  She does so, moreover, because solicited by another person,
Mariana.  One might argue that she's being manipulated by the Duke in
order to learn the value of forgiveness.  No matter. This does not
change her action, and its ethical import, in any substantive way.
She's still asking forgiveness for someone who wronged her, and not
doing it in hopes of any sort of reward.  It's not self-interested, and
therefore not a political act.  Nor, I think, can it be exhausted by
reference to a politics which frames it.  The Duke's plot, if its goal
to make her more amenable to his marriage proposal, is only equivocally
successful.  Moreover, the (false) situation which the Duke establishes
is only the occasion for Isabella's generosity, not its motive.

The final word is not that of Vincentio, plotting to re-establish order,
and leave himself in complete and even tyrannous control.  It is the
unspoken word of Isabella.  In some ways, this is far more effective
than the 'nothing' of Cordelia, since it does not enter into language,
and does not, therefore, become interpretable within a series of
exchanges, trades and trade-offs.

Cheers,
Seán.

[2]-------------------------------------------------------------
From:           Don Bloom <dbloo@asms.net>
Date:           Wednesday, 14 Jun 2000 12:16:30 -0700
Subject: 11.1222 Re: Isabella's Chastity
Comment:        Re: SHK 11.1222 Re: Isabella's Chastity

Concerning Ed Taft and the doctrine of sin and crime:

As I suspected, we are talking at cross-purposes and are in general
agreement with the problem lying in making each other understood. For
example, I am mildly horrified to discover that Ed thinks I believe
"adultery, stealing, injuring another, rape, and killing another are
[not] mortal sins." My point was the opposite: they are *both* mortal
sins *and* crimes. Reviewing what I wrote at the time, however, I
realize that I included the word "venial" in a place that conveyed the
idea that I was describing them with that word. Finding gaffes of that
sort are what editors are for.

A slightly less serious question arises with "The sin of lust is NOT
committed by the look. It is committed either (1) by willing to look or,
if the look is not willed, by then willingly giving in to the thoughts
of lust that follow. Note that the will is, as always, paramount." In
this case, I have no apology to offer. What I wrote was "the sin is
committed with the look." I still stand by this statement, though it is
not one I regard as either profound or controversial. Ed amplifies the
point by bringing in the will: you either willfully find a sight that
will stimulate your lust, or, having seen something that might do so,
you give in (willfully) to the lustful thought. I cannot find a point of
disagreement, either with what I said originally or think now.

"What we do only to ourselves can be a crime: suicide is the most
obvious example." Well, sort of -- this point is rather a two-edged
sword. On the one hand, it is part of the argument of those who hold
that suicide should not be condemned as either crime or sin. On the
other hand, it is also an underlying theme for those who hold with the
reasonableness of criminalizing "victimless crimes" ("vice"), including
prostitution and drug use. Either way, to my mind it is an exception
that proves the rule.  Societies determine crimes; God determines sin.

"'Ugly thoughts that pass through our consciousness'" ARE sins (and can
lead to crimes) IF the will gives in and inclines to them -- again, note
the primacy of the will. If the will does NOT give in to them, then and
only then are they harmless (See Adam's explanation of Eve's dream
in_Paradise Lost_, Book 5, lines 117-119.)" Of course (I was thinking of
this passage, in fact), but the problem lies in determining to what
extent the will "inclines" to these sinful thoughts, and what "giving
in" consists of:  much easier to talk about than know with exactitude.
Perhaps the problem lies in determining just what is willed. (Could it
be that if Martin Luther had understood this there would have been no
Protestant Reformation?)

I thank Ed for his references, and plan to look them up when I have the
opportunity. I still disagree with his assertion about intention and
commission being equally criminal, but that may be simply a
denominational difference, and we can agree to disagree. Fortunately,
the Thirty Years War is over.

In general, I hope this discussion has shed some light the vexing matter
of guilt and innocence in MM. I still find Claudio a cad for treating
his sister that way, and Isabella a victimized woman struggling to work
out her salvation in fear and trembling. I know that is not a palatable
idea nowadays, but I suspect that Shakespeare at least understood it,
and perhaps admired it.

Regards,
don bloom

[3]-------------------------------------------------------------
From:           Philip Tomposki <PhilipTski@aol.com>
Date:           Wednesday, 14 Jun 2000 16:11:36 EDT
Subject:        Re: Isabella's Chastity

I'm no legal expert, much less an expert on English Renaissance law, but
I believe Angelo has committed a crime, it's called extortion (or is it
blackmail?)  Angelo doesn't simply think about bedding Isabella, he
threatens her with the death of her brother unless she succumbs.  In
law, an attempt to commit a crime, versus simply contemplating a crime,
is still a criminal act, although a lesser one than the crime itself.
If I attempt to shoot someone and miss, I'm charged with the lesser
crime of attempted murder.  (Apparently the law views incompetence, or
at least bad aim, as a mitigating factor.) Angelo is probably not guilty
of attempted rape because rape, legally, involves force.  (I'm guessing
here, so the legal eagles may correct me on this.)  But the threat
itself is a criminal act.

Philip Tomposki


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