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SHAKSPER 1994: Re: The Human Condition
From: Hardy M. Cook (hmcook@boe00.minc.umd.edu) Date: 02/07/94
Shakespeare Electronic Conference, Vol. 5, No. 0098. Monday, 7 February 1994. From: Pat Buckridge <P.Buckridge@hum.gu.edu.au> Date: Monday, 7 Feb 1994 12:35:13 +1000 (EST) Subject: The Human Condition This is my first foray, so forgive me if I get the tone wrong. My initial reaction to the 'universality' debate was to cheer on the critics of Terence Hawkes, but this may have been irritation at the glib 'alterity' claims which are typical of a certain kind of Cultural Studies. But I've become increasingly uncomfortable at the certainty with which Richard Jordan et al have been asserting, contra Hawkes, a clear and absolute distinction between human experiences and the cultural meanings attributed to them by particular societies. Surely experience - even biolgical experience - is itself determined, to some extent, by its cultural meaning. Hunger, to continue with that example, may well be experienced differently by people for whom hunger has a redemptive meaning than by people for whom it is simply a state of painful deprivation. And how can one doubt that orgasm will be experienced differently if you believe each one shortens your life-span than if you think of it as a healthy release of tension? One has only to read the work of people like Marcel Mauss and Norbert Elias or, more recently, Peter Brown (The Body in History) and Thomas Laqueur (Making Sex) to see that physical experiences, and not just their cultural meanings, are indeed not universal. Of course, this doesn't warrant the Hawkesian assumption that they will always, or necessarily, or even usually, be different in different cultures. To that extent I agree with Jordan. Experiences *and* their meanings may well be substantially the same across different cultures. To assert otherwise is itself a universalising statement. Patrick Buckridge.
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