![]() |
||||||
|
SHAKSPER 1993: Re: The Human Condition
From: Hardy M. Cook (hmcook@boe00.minc.umd.edu) Date: 12/18/93
Shakespeare Electronic Conference, Vol. 4, No. 956. Saturday, 18 December 1993. From: John Cox <COX@HOPE.CIT.HOPE.EDU> Date: Friday, 17 Dec 1993 13:03:04 -0500 (EST) Subject: 4.0953 Re: The Human Condition Comment: Re: SHK 4.0953 Re: The Human Condition For those of us who believe that mortality defines the human condition, as Al Cacicedo suggests, I offer the following anecdote. I was recently discussing the rudiments of logical argumentation with my first-year composition class. I pointed out that the limitation of induc- tive reasoning is the necessity for the inductive leap: even "the sun will rise tomorrow" is subject to the reservation that we haven't actually seen it rise yet. Turning to deductive reasoning, I pointed out that no "leaps" are necessary in a well-constructed syllogism, but that if the syllogism is to have some application to real life, then the premises have to be true to life. As an example, I used the traditional syllogism that begins, "All people are mortal." When I explained the example, one attentive student raised her hand to object that the major premise in that syllogism involves an inductive leap: though we know of no exceptions to the rule stated by the premise, those who are alive have not yet died, so the same reservation applies to the syllogism as to the inductive inference that the sun will rise tomorrow. I wish my student had been in Aristotle's class when he expounded the syllogism. John Cox
|
|
|||||